When the Inquisitorial and Adversary Systems Collide:
Teaching Trial Advocacy to Latin American Lawyers

Leonard L. Cavise1
Introduction
One of the more dramatic international legal developments of the last generation
has been the conversion of the legal systems of most of the countries in Latin America
from the inquisitorial model to the accusatorial model for the preparation and trial of
both civil and criminal cases2 A trial in Latin America conducted under a loose
interpretation of the inquisitorial or European model has traditionally been little more
than an exercise in the reading of long affidavits by victims and witnesses, certifications
of various police and other official records and a decision by the judge. For the parties
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to give live testimony was a rare occurrence which, when it happened, would then be
almost totally controlled by the judge. The investigation and preparatory stage was
equally dominated by the judge.3 The role of the lawyers for the parties at trial was
confined almost exclusively to legal argumentation.4 The conversion to the accusatorial
or so-called American party model has been effectuated by reform projects in a large
number of countries, followed by statutory enactments, often of entirely new procedural
codes. This statutory reform establishes the new foundation to which the Latin lawyer
must now adapt. What remains beyond that is for those lawyers to develop the
necessary expertise in practice skills to implement that reform.
The purpose of this article is to examine the reactions of Latin American litigators
to some of the major differences in trial procedures between the inquisitorial model and
the party model. The context for the observations was a series of projects spanning a
decade whose objective was to teach attorneys steeped in the inquisitorial to transition
to the accusatorial. During the course of the projects, the participants found that the
procedural differences are substantial. Certain of those differences gave the
participants reason to pause and question the utility and efficacy of some of the
accusatorial trial procedures which American litigators have long accepted as the
correct way in which to proceed. This article will review only those changes which
caused the Latin lawyers the greatest degree of upset. The challenge to the existing
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trial culture, as they understood it, combined with the sometimes difficult learning curve
of the various American-model trial competencies, induced reluctance if not outright
rejection of aspects of the accusatorial model.
The focus of the article is on Latin America, first, because the author’s
experience is centered in those countries but also because the wholesale abandonment
of the inquisitorial model in most of the countries of Central and South America
represents a seismic shift in the international legal landscape which will have
implications far beyond statutory reform.
The first part of this article will review the author’s experience in teaching trial
competencies to Latin lawyers through this series of both short and long term transition
projects. The second part will describe in very basic fashion the fundamental
differences in the two models, so as to highlight the reasons for the difficulties
encountered in teaching oral practice or oralidad.5 The third part will review those trial
skills that were greeted by the Latin lawyers with reluctance, suspicion or outright
criticism. Finally, though it is very much too early to assess the success of the
transition, several ideas for the future are offered to ease the process of change.
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Background
For fifteen years, it has been the author’s privilege to train lawyers and judges
from various parts of the world in a wide variety of lawyering skills.6 Lawyers and judges
from Poland, Ukraine, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Macao, Palestine, Palestine,
Spain, Italy and, in particular, much of Central and South America have participated
with the author in projects designed to compare law or train non-American lawyers in
various trial competencies. Each program is custom-built, depending on the
competency training sought or the focus of the grant under which the training was
conducted. Substantive law programs have run the gamut from teaching the various
international instruments relevant to practice, to doctrinal areas such as U.S. juvenile
law, criminal law and procedure, the rules of evidence and, in the case of the
Palestinian judges program, a judicial code of ethics. In addition, the author has
escorted seven groups of law students to the Mexican state of Chiapas to work in local
human rights legal offices, primarily on issues affecting the indigenous population.7
The focus here is on the teaching of trial advocacy, in particular, to lawyers from
Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela. In discussion
with colleagues from other countries, particularly those European countries that are also
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in the process of transition, such as Italy, it is clear that the concerns of the Latin
lawyers were very similar to those of the Europeans, with cross-examination, pleabargaining, and the jury system provoking the greatest suspicion of the model.
Most of the projects described focused on oralidad. The projects11 emanated
from a wide variety of funding sources, including U.S. Government agencies. Project
length would vary from one week to three months. The number of participants would
vary. While it was uncommon to have a trial training project of more than 20
participants, it sometimes happened that the sessions would be opened to a wider
audience of students or professionals who, though not actually participating, were
interested in the proceedings. This was the case at almost all university-connected
projects and also with the Judicial Council in Venezuela.
Under rubrics such as Human Rights, Rule of Law, or Sustainable Democracy
development, various government, non-government and international organizations
and agencies developed action plans including private sector lawyers for projects
ranging from judicial reform to court management to training skills programs. These
initiatives, and the oralidad training in particular, from the United Nations,12 U.S. State
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Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank13
and others became standard components of literally hundreds of reform proposals
offered to the private sector for implementation.14
Though the climate of distrust of the United States is today much stronger, there
was, even then, substantial question among the participants as to whether the course
content had been dictated or screened by any U.S. government funder. The question
was also raised as to whether the participants themselves had been chosen by some
unstated political criteria with an expectation that their future work would somehow
serve U.S. interests. These are impossible questions to answer without access to the
internal deliberations of the agency in question. It is, however, possible to state
categorically that at no time was there ever any attempt or even suggestion to influence
the content of the course, the content of the author’s teaching, or any other aspect of
the author’s participation or perspective, political or otherwise. As to the participants, it
can only be stated with certainty, from this vantage point, that there was a wide variety
of political perspectives within the various groups and that the discussions were
completely politically uninhibited. This is not to imply that one didn’t notice, from time to
time, that a lawyer participant might defer or hesitate to confront a judge participant
from the same country15 and that, as a result, the dynamic might not have been quite as
13

See generally, Webb, Legal and Institutional Reform Strategy and Implementation: A
World Bank Perspective, 30 Law and Policy in International Business 161 (Winter 1999).
14

For a description of the efforts of international organizations in the area of judicial
reform, see Justice Delayed/Judicial Reform in Latin America (Jarquin and Carrillo, eds) John
Hopkins University Press, 1998
15

Most groups were composed either of lawyers or judges but, in at least one case, the
participants were mixed. Most of the lawyer groups were composed, in the criminal context,
6

robust as it might have been, but that is not a restraint placed upon the groups by the
funders.
USAID, as the largest funder of these and similar projects world-wide, plays a
diverse role internationally.16 While it may, in one locale, serve as the on-the-ground
face of U.S. government policy, it may, in another location, operate to improve domestic
systems, from the sewers and water filtration to the law schools and the legal system.
In the case of Latin America, it seems clear that the impetus for the various U.S.
government programs in the Rule of Law area, is to develop a stable, predictable and
overhauled legal system in target Latin countries. From the perspective of U.S. foreign
policy, perhaps those improvements will encourage U.S. multinationals to see the
particular environment as safe or at least more predictable for business in a developing
“free trade” era.17 By the same token, that “democratization” or, better put, that
reconfiguration of the courts to mirror U.S. practice, will, concomitantly, help the Latin
lawyers to become better litigators in their own right and to do battle in their own courts
more of public defenders than prosecutors. Civil lawyers tend, in Latin America, to have a very
general practice.
16
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on an even footing with all parties. For lawyers who had never seen themselves as
having any real control over the presentation and development of the investigation and
trial, this change represents a true revolution in the potential for all lawyers to serve
their own communities as legal advocates rather than, as has always been the case, to
simply bow to the authorized stake-holders and weakly add collateral pieces of
argument or evidence which the court may or may not even acknowledge or take into
consideration.
The author’s role was in the development of trial skills among the lawyers of the
various Latin countries. Though the transition to oralidad posed the greatest
challenge, the transfer of power from the judge to the lawyers in the presentation of the
case requires a very substantial retooling for judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and
civil litigants. The author’s personal motivation was to help see that those lawyers who
previously had little access to the key decisions of the trial system could now litigate as
lawyers trained to do battle in ways previously unknown–lawyers in control of the case,
with the ability to conduct competent witness examinations, with the imagination to
present a variety of forms of evidence, to make legal arguments based upon the facts
as developed right there in the courtroom, with the ability to object to unreliable or
inadmissible evidence, and unafraid to exercise the right to disagree with the trial judge.
These changes will eventually not only change the lives of their clients but will also
change the entire legal culture of the country.
The Inquisitorial Model
The European and American trial systems are the products of two very different
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procedural cultures. The European system,0 itself experiencing major reform
initiatives,20 has traditionally reduced the trial phase to a mere formality due primarily to
the role of the judge. In the investigatory phase, the judge of the investigation (the juge
d’instruction in the French system, often cited as the quintessential example of an
unreformed European model) is normally in charge of the investigation and collection of
the evidence, with the goal of determining if a crime was committed and, if so, by
whom.21 The judge is, in fact, expected to thoroughly pursue the investigation to its
evidentiary conclusion before the case is turned over either to the public prosecutor or
another judge to enter the trial phase. The investigative judge does so in closed
proceedings, and without the benefit of counsel representing the parties. If there is live
testimony by a witness, it is usually before a clerk who writes the testimony down in the
form of a statement and later presents it to the judge, without any cross-examination,
along with the entirety of the investigative file.22 The proceedings are characterized as
0
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“nonadversarial” because each of the participants in this phase is independent, whether
they be appointed rapporteurs or judges.23
Because of the judge’s dominant role in the development of the case and the
importance of the investigatory judge’s findings, the trial phase (primera instancia)
became merely a confirmation of the findings of the investigation and, therefore, the
principle of orality was of little utility.24 Should actual testimony be taken, it is normally
the judge who would call the witness and conduct the examination whereas, in the
adversarial system, any such active questioning by a judge is viewed as a challenge to
the party attorneys and is looked at askance by courts of appeal.
The criminal prosecutor, in the inquisitorial system, often is seen as an “official”
of the state or the executive branch whose role is not to get a conviction but rather to
seek the truth and to make conclusions independently from the judge.25 The
prosecutor, in the inquisitorial model, usually makes his/her initial appearance on the
scene much earlier than any defense lawyer. As a result, the criminal defense lawyer
23
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and the client are seldom full participants in the process. They arrive late to the
proceedings and their right to confront and present evidence exists only insofar as the
judge chooses to pursue the right. Even under the new party model, many Latin
American countries have opted to give the prosecution control of the investigation
phase, leaving defense counsel to protest at the door or exercise extraordinary initiative
to embark on a defense investigation.26
Latin-American adaptations of the European model have been generally faithful
to the most important elements of the Continental tradition. To gain a basic
understanding of the Latin trial procedural codes, it must also be understood that
Constitutional rights in most Latin American countries have been codified along with the
principal structural components of the legal system, including individual rights, into the
national Constitution. Most countries separate powers into the executive, legislative,
and judicial. Because funding for the judiciary usually depends upon the executive or
the legislature and because appointment to the bench is often used as a political
reward, the judiciary is usually the most compromised of the three branches, leading to
a highly partisan administration of justice27 where political manipulation and
administrative and budgetary neglect are endemic.28 The basic human rights included
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in the Constitutions include free speech, presumption of innocence, the right against
self-incrimination, the right to counsel, prohibitions against lengthy detentions without
trial, and due process.29 As in most systems, the gap between Constitutional theory and
practice is substantial.
Most of the Latin American legal systems are also code-based, with case
precedent either non-existent or playing a distinctly collateral role in the process.30 That
tradition is firmly entrenched and is not expected to change under the party model.
This reality, of necessity, requires that new codes be thorough, comprehensive and
extremely well-drafted so as to include or at least contemplate every conceivable
procedural problem. Otherwise, there is little hope of uniform application of the laws or
the procedure even within national boundaries. In those countries with a large
indigenous population,31 “customary” law will often conflict with national legislation,
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leading to a number of codifications of indigenous law. Aside from the universally
recognized Supreme Court, most of the countries, consistent with the European model,
also have a Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional) which reviews matters of
Consitutionality in actions against the federal government or even the Supreme Court.
Other specialized courts such as Electoral Tribunals, Juvenile Courts, Military courts, or
Courts of Human Rights may also exist.
The inquisitorial model as adapted to the various Latin systems has retained the
fundamental European characteristics but with a number of culturally or politicallydictated modifications in each Latin-American national system. Most importantly to the
subject here, the process, before the transition, was shrouded in secrecy and was
almost completely in writing.32 The judge’s investigative work, produced in what was
called a sumario, often took years while a criminal defendant waited in jail or the civil
parties went uncompensated. Just as there is little judicial oversight of the police, there
has been traditionally even less oversight of the work of the judiciary. In Mexico, for
example, it is common for the Judge’s secretary to oversee case investigation and
development, including the statement of the defendant, while judges themselves
seldom appear.33 The role of counsel, even where the codes stipulate that counsel
should be appointed, is minimal until well into the investigation phase and normally not
Convention 169 sets forth guarantees of the collective rights of the indigenous, rights to their
ancestral communal lands, cultural development, and economic and social development.
32
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until the defendant, in the criminal case, has at least made a statement.34
It is undeniable that the judge, not the litigants, has been in charge during the
preliminary and the trial stage.35 Only after the investigation did the attorneys for the
parties take a more active role which, at that, was confined to written pleadings.36 The
perception of arbitrariness, the insulation of the judicial elite, the “stultifying formalism”
that “throws the facts of life out of court.”37 and the desire for legitimacy have fueled
many of these changes toward the party system.
The Lawyers and Judges
The body of experience from which this article is drawn consists of over fifteen
groups of lawyers and judges from Latin America whose participation in these projects
was focused on learning the basics of trial advocacy skills. The first group consisted of
14 “human rights” lawyers, mostly from El Salvador, who spent three months in Chicago
trying to learn the accusatorial or party system. The “human rights” theme of the group
was aspirational. Most of the lawyers were either academics who were practicing law,
along with several public defenders. That project was followed by seven programs for
Guatemalan lawyers who, over the next three years, came to DePaul for shorter but
more intense trainings. These groups consisted mainly of sitting judges,38 public
34
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defenders, prosecutors and a few academics. The last group brought to Chicago
specifically for trial skills training was part of what was called an Inter-American Clinic,
funded by the international Labor Organization, to help locally-based human rights
lawyers to litigate, party-fashion, in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in
Washington and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica.
These 21 lawyers were from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Chiapas, Mexico.
The principal distinguishing feature of this group is that each came to the program
equipped with a real case file to litigate, looking to the project to teach them how to
litigate.39
Subsequent trainings were conducted in the home country, either by design or
because, after September 11, the participant visa issue became too onerous and it was
determined that the several remaining programs should be conducted abroad. One
week or longer training sessions were held in Venezuela, for judges and public
defenders, Guatemala, for professors and lawyers on the rules of evidence, Costa Rica,
for attorneys planning to litigate in the Inter-American Court for Human Rights, and

Hammergren, Judicial Training and Justice Reform, USAID, Rule of Law Series, Pub. No. PNACD-021 (Washington, 1998).
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Chiapas, Mexico for human rights lawyers.40
Methodology
The project objective started from the premise that countries in transition from
the inquisitorial to the accusatorial model could learn from the structure and operation
of the accusatory American trial. In no way, however, was homogeneity the goal of the
programs, particularly given the diversity of the Latin American legal systems. The
author approached the task with some misgivings since it is easier to admire the
structure of the American system rather than its actual operation. One concern was
that the programs would teach habits unique to the American way of trying cases and
not suitable for adaptation. It was also of concern that the major weaknesses, some
would say the essential dysfunction of the trial system (or at least the jury trial system)
here would be patently obvious and lead to a wholesale rejection of what is probably a
theoretically more desirable method– the party method. Finally, it was also clear that
those components of the European model that had become co-extensive with Latin
American tradition would also be preserved.41 To recognize and accept those traditions,
whether or not they made sense in the American system or even if their purpose in the
national system (as described by the students) was unclear, would also be a frequent
challenge.
Resolved never to defend the indefensible and committed to helping Latin
40
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lawyers make this important transition with a sensitivity to their local custom and
practice made the work easier as our sessions usually included an acknowledgment of
the pertinent weaknesses of American practice and its irrelevance to many of the local
issues faced by participating lawyers. Admitting the frailty of the notion of justice, that
judges and juries everywhere can be biased, that there is sometimes a great distance
between theory and practice and then sharing with the students a trial lawyer’s natural
cynicism about due process and the system meant to support it was actually a bonding
experience that enabled instructor and student to communicate more frankly and
directly.
Communicating with the trial lawyers is a predictable issue. As a long-time
francophone and recent convert to Spanish, language proficiency was not a major
barrier in Latin America, France, Spain, or the countries of North Africa. In other
countries, consecutive translation was always available. Even with everyday fluency, a
legal vocabulary is a separate vernacular requiring additional preparation.
Another challenge was the manner in which the classes were to be conducted.
Most of the skills training models in American law schools are unknown to Latin
American lawyers. Legal education, for the most part, consists of very large classes
delivered in the lecture format.42 Seldom is there an opportunity for any student
41
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participation, much less any dialogue, Socratic or otherwise, between teacher and
student. Only recently have legal clinics begun to appear in Latin countries but, even
then, the focus is seldom on litigation skills but rather on general client advocacy
through letter writing, some investigation, accompaniment, etc. This situation is
complicated by the fact that, in Latin law schools, there is very little emphasis on the
needs of practice or procedural rules and virtually no instruction on oralidad.43 Most
law students in Latin America are offered only very theoretical or historical courses
which emphasize jurisprudential development to the detriment of application.44 Nor are
there many specialty courses such as trial advocacy. In fact, the Latin American
lawyer never attended law school as Americans know it. What is called law school is
merely a “major” (sometimes a major that excludes all other disciplines) that one
chooses for the undergraduate years. There is no post-graduate requirement and most
law school professors are part-time due to the low salaries.45
The standard method for teaching trial advocacy in American law schools is the
simulation/critique method.46 It was explained to the foreign attorneys that there would
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Field and Fisher III, supra, note 5, p. 79 (commenting on the growing interest in Central
American law schools in oralidad).
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See Hendrix, Steven E., Restructuring Legal Education in Guatemala: A model for law
School Reform in Latin America, Journal of Legal Education, Vol 54, Dec. 2004.
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For a general discussion of the traditional mode of Latin legal education, see Joseph R.
Thome, Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America,
2000 Wis.L.Rev. 691. See also Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in
Latin America, 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 167 (Fall, 1995)
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For an early seminal work on the simulation method, see Michael Meltsner and Philip
G. Schrag, Towards Simulation in Legal Education: An Experimental Course in Pre-Trial
Litigation (1975). See also Thomas F. Geraghty, Foreword: Teaching Trial Advocacy in the 90s
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be very little lecture and that our basic routine would be to have the students prepare
and then present the assigned trial exercises. After the presentation, there would be a
critique and, time permitting, some discussion. The discussions would often center on
a subject completely unfamiliar to them, for example, the notion of a theory of the case
and how to weave it into the examination. In the selection of trial exercises, there was
an emphasis placed on opening and closing statements, direct, cross and redirect
examination. There was less of an emphasis on motions practice or other legal
argument on the theory that those advocacy skills would be more familiar to the
participating students, most of whom had made legal argument in court. A key part of
the presentation was always a demonstration of how the particular exercise should be
done. That demonstration could, depending on the skill level of the group, be done
before or after the student exercises on the particular trial skill in question. Finding law
students who spoke Spanish fluently enough to perform an opening or closing
argument or a witness examination scripted by the author or to act as witnesses was
not difficult.47 The instructor’s critique usually followed the recommended American
pattern: usually no more than two points which draw specifically from what the student
had said, no more than 3-4 minutes in length before moving on to the next student.
Longer discussions, when necessary, were usually had at the end of the students’
performances.48
and Beyond, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 687 (1991).
47

In other countries, such as Italy or Palestine, the instructor did the demonstration which
was then translated consecutively, sentence by sentence.
48

This teaching methodology is drawn principally from the “learn-by-doing” method
initiated and fostered by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy. See Teachers’ Manual for
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Very little time was spent studying the recodification of procedure. That inquiry
was left to the individuals, many of whom had already gone through training programs
on the substance and some of the implications of the new procedures. Many had come
to understand the daunting nature of learning the fundamentals of the party system. 49
Because they were accustomed only to “trial by affidavit,” they understood and
accepted that oralidad training would be the principal objective of the program.50
The decision was made to maximize the time each student spent in actual oral
advocacy. In advance of the beginning of the course, the students were presented
with normally three simulated case files fully translated into Spanish,51 complete with
photos of real evidence, simulated police or accident reports, reports of experts, pretrial
Problems and Cases in Criminal Trial Advocacy, National Institute for Trial Advocacy (2nd Ed.
1989).
49

In Guatemala, for example, the enactment, in July, 1994, of the Criminal Procedures
Code required sweeping changes in the key legal sector institutions: the court system (Organismo
Judicial), the Prosecutors Office and the Public Defenders Office. Personnel from each of these
institutions need to be trained in their individual and institutional roles under the new party
system.
50

It should also be noted that considerably less time was spent on hearing procedures in
civil cases. On one hand, criminal systems have been the priority of most countries, given the
backlogs in cases and onerously long pretrial detention. Recodification of the law of civil
procedure has, therefore, proceeded at a much slower pace than the criminal counterpart. The
Civil Procedure Code of Costa Rica took effect in 1998 but has been very slow to implement. In
Uruguay, where the Civil Code reform was accompanied by a tripling in the number of available
and trained judges, the results have been much different. There is a model civil procedure code
available to reform projects: the Model Ibero-American Code of Procedure. See Martha Field
and William Fisher III, supra, note 5, at p. 32,40, 71.
51

When translation is necessary, the case files have to be forwarded well in advance of the
program. The Spanish translation was not always difficult, given the number of law students or
cooperating Latin law professors who could either do or arrange to have the translating done.
The problem was more severe in Palestine where the issue of translation into Arabic was more
difficult.
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statements. depositions, and the like. The simulated files distributed were much like
the standard case files used in the trial advocacy course.52 Also distributed was an
overview of the basic trial schematic explaining the order of the presentation of the
opposing cases. In some cases, translated descriptive summaries giving an overview
of the trial system, a description of the basic evidentiary objections, and a listing of
possible pretrial motions were also handed out.
The instructor’s preparation, in addition to a thorough understanding of the case
files assigned and adequate training in the critique method, included a review of the
recent codifications of the participating countries. That might include the new code of
criminal procedure or legislation mandating a transition to the party system or
modifications of the traditional system. The task is easier when one is seeking only to
highlight differences in procedure. Since most Latin American countries are “code”
countries and case precedent plays much less a role than in this country, there was
seldom any case law to review.
The course’s first session was usually devoted to an explanation of the trial
phase and an abbreviated look at U.S. pretrial civil or criminal procedure. Those
overviews were presented in a discussion format to draw out the differences and clarify
several of the U.S. idiosyncracies, sometimes with computer graphics or handouts to
help students visualize the problems. Each lawyer was then assigned to a party in one
of the cases, instructed to review the entire file, and to be prepared to present whatever
exercise was scheduled for the next class. Once assigned to a particular party, the
52

See, e.g., Thomas A. Mauet and Warren D. Wolfson, Materials in Trial Advocacy:
Problems and Cases, 5th Ed. (2002).
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student would advocate that party’s interest for all of the exercises. Should there be
time in the program to repeat the exercises, students would then be assigned to
represent a different party in a different case. It was recommended that the participants
work in small groups to better understand the file and to develop a theory of the case.
It was also recommended that the students conduct small group oral “rehearsals” of the
exercises. That particular recommendation was less likely to be followed unless
student program assistants actually scheduled practice sessions.
At each class session, a prosecutor and defender or plaintiff and defendant from
each of the “teams” assigned to a particular case would be designated to begin a series
of repetitions of the assignment for each of the several case studies. One student in the
group would perform, “opposing counsel” would be making objections and waiting to do
the cross-examination or the responsive argument and other group members would
observe, role-play the witness, or sit as the judge. The judge role-play was more
valuable than the witness role-play as it gave the attorneys an opportunity to feel firsthand the frustration of the judge transitioning to the party model. If resources are
available, outsiders are better suited to act as witnesses, simulating the equivocation,
inconsistency and lack of articulation of a typical trial witness. The instructor’s role, as it
is in law school trial advocacy, was to observe but not to stop the exercise for any
reason until ready for the critique. The students were told that they should attempt to
resolve their own difficulties by staying in role and that conflicts were to be decided by
the judge. Perhaps surprisingly, very few students had “breakdowns” in the middle of
an exercise.
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In the witness examination exercises, the students were to present direct, cross
and redirect even though there is no provision in most Latin American procedural
codes, even the new ones, for redirect. We did not conduct a simulated rebuttal case
for the state or plaintiffs, again departing from actual practice but following the standard
trial advocacy format. As a matter of the instructor’s preference, two students would
perform an exercise representing the opposing parties before each critique. Though
the critique would not occur until there had been two performances, the critique itself
was individualized. Exercises were limited in time so that each student assigned in a
class ranging from 10-15 people could perform at least once per 2 or 2 1/2 hour class
session. This posed a problem for these experienced lawyers who, if nothing else,
were accustomed to making long speeches and then justifying themselves latter during
the critique. It was often necessary for the instructor to cut short an examination or
argument that was rambling.
At the conclusion of the course, it would be ideal to conduct an entire mock trial
but time was truly of the essence in all but the first of these programs. That first
program, three months in length, was luxuriously arranged so as to not only allow for
full final mock trials, but also allow actual visits to civil and criminal trials and to dialogue
with Hispanic judges and lawyers about the trial system. At the very least, time should
be left to conduct an evaluation of the program and to give each of the students more
personal, detailed feedback than can be done in the classroom atmosphere.
Nature of the Resistance
The mistakes made by the program lawyers very substantially mirrored the
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mistakes that American law students are prone to make. To mention a few at the
outset, it was very infrequent that arguments or witness examinations reflected a
coherent theory of the case; the basic rules of cross-examination were violated with
impunity, with particular note of the participants’ insistence on asking open-ended
questions on cross-examination; not understanding the importance of constructing a
narrative so the trier of fact has the impression of being told a story (what American
lawyers would call a jury-centered approach) or even the importance of artful
presentational or rhetorical skills in general, many of the students would persist in
reading their prepared scripts or using cross-examination as a fishing expedition where
distracting and useless arguments with the witness were inevitable.
Normally, the judges showed an over-eagerness to speak and interrupt in court.
Presumably, that was because there were accustomed to running the courtroom in their
national systems. The practicing attorneys, whether prosecutors, defense lawyers or
private practitioners, were often, at the outset, timid and reluctant. One of the many
satisfactions with teaching this type of program is that, with time and practice, the
lawyers relax, begin to find their “voice” in the courtroom. They become more engaged
not only in understanding the orthodox techniques but also in developing their own
sense of their personality in the courtroom. Opening and closing arguments were the
easiest for the lawyers to simulate because of the similarity with legal argument.
The participants found it difficult to accept several of the fundamentals of the
American trial system. Though there is no single component of our system that met
with unanimous disapproval, it is possible to segregate out a number of the aspects of
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the party trial system that met with the most resistance.
A) The jury system. Of the many unusual reactions, perhaps the most
unanticipated was the almost complete rejection of the jury system.53 The most
common observation was that cases must be tried by “competent” people, trained in the
law, and commanding of respect. A jury chosen at random from the citizenry would
simply not be intelligent or learned enough to resolve complicated factual issues and
would, therefore, operate to denigrate the whole system. The assurance that the jury
would be instructed in the law and that their main job was to decide the contested facts
as highlighted by the lawyers for both sides was of little consolation. Even lawyers from
the most corrupt legal systems, where few judges would dream of contradicting the
police or military authorities, and where one would think a randomly-selected jury would
offer the best chance of an honest, unbiased result, even they were quick to condemn
leaving so heavy a social responsibility on the shoulders of the average citizen. The
most left-leaning of the lawyers, whom I had expected to side with the democracybuilding tactic of letting the people decide important issues which affect the social fabric
such as criminal conduct , argued that, ideally, members of the community should sit in
judgement of each other but that the whole notion was contrary to their tradition and
culture and that their countries were not yet ready for the citizen jury.
Given the high rates of illiteracy in so many Latin countries and the repressive
state apparatus that would intimidate many jurors into coming to a government-desired
result, it shouldn’t be completely surprising that even habitually anti-government lawyers
would think they had a better chance with a judge than with a jury. There was also the
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perception, not altogether unreasonable, that, with juries, the premium on charlatanism
by the trial lawyers would increase and performance, rather than the facts or a sense of
justice, would dictate the outcome. They were not surprised to hear of the very low
rates of actual juries in this country.54 Their conclusion from the data was that American
lawyers also shared their distrust of juries. Although that is sometimes the case, the
primary reason for the low rate of juries in this country is the time and expense burden
that juries place on an already over-loaded trial calendar in this, the most litigious of all
countries.55
B) The suggestibility of cross-examination. Cross-examination posed any
number of both principled and pragmatic objections. The most common complaint was
that, because leading questions are suggestive, the fairness of the proceeding is
compromised. Lawyers given the normal latitude on cross were seen as exercising too
much control over the witness and putting words into the witness’ mouth. Indeed,
substantial time was spent instructing students on the phrasing of questions so as to
elicit one word responses as well as the development of the ability to cut off a witness
who wishes to respond beyond the narrow parameters of the closed-ended question
53

None of the revised codes have, so far, recommended the adoption of the jury system.
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Of the 98,786 tort cases that were terminated in U.S. District courts during fiscal years
2202 and 2003, 1,647 or 2% were decided by a bench or jury trial. Over 95% of all criminal
cases are terminated by guilty pleas and fewer than 5% go to bench or jury trial. U.S.Department
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2002. See
generally, Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J.Empirical Leg.Studies 459 (2004)
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See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 Duke L.J. 447, 456 (2004)(arguing that, in fact, Americans
are not the most litigious of all people but rather that Americans tend more than any other
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that was asked. It was also recommended, consistent with basic trial teaching
orthodoxy, that the cross-examiner avoid asking any question to which he/she did not
already know the answer and that certain areas of the direct testimony should just be
avoided on cross where there was nothing to gain.56
The notion that the cross-examiner would not review all of the testimony given on
direct or that the lawyer would simply direct the witness’ testimony to a few areas of
weakness was foreign to most of them. As a result, there were many questions to the
effect of “were you sure when you said on direct...” or “is it possible that you were
mistaken when you said....” Coupled with the idea that a witness on cross-examination
should not be allowed to give any extended answers, and that, in reality, it is the lawyer
who is testifying by virtue of the weave of the questions, and, finally, that the witness on
cross is merely confirming what the lawyer is actually stating (albeit in question form),
the overall impression taken away by program participants was often that crossexamination seemed over-bearing and oppressive. In addition to those observations,
many of the students also felt that witnesses in their countries would not have the
temerity to stand their ground during an aggressive cross-examination and that a lot of
“badgering” objections would be necessary.
C) The duty to investigate. The American lawyer is accustomed to accepting
the duty to the client to begin the investigation and preparation for trial virtually at the
moment of accepting the case. The project participants often found it difficult to accept
nationality to use litigation to solve social problems).
56

Thomas A. Mauet, Trials: Strategy, Skills, and the New Powers of Persuasion, (Aspen,
2005, Ch. 6.4, p. 217
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that they should do an investigation independent of the police and prosecutorial
authorities. They were taken aback when told that the party model demanded that
each lawyer sift through the evidence, and then decide which evidence their client
should present and which evidence is likely to be presented by the opponent.
Moreover, the suggestion that the defense (in criminal cases) would race the
prosecution to get statements from the witnesses was antithetical to their notion that the
defense is not even activated until the investigation is complete, an arrest has been
made and the prosecution has made a formal recommendation. Under the old model,
the judge supervised the continuing investigation while the parties watched. Under the
new systems, it is not specified in the codes exactly what procedures are to be followed
and when those procedures are activated but it seemed the consensus that the duty to
investigate transfers from the judge to the prosecution. In some countries, it seemed
clear that the prosecution would supervise police activity. In others, the prosecution is
left to review police evidence or to conduct a separate investigation. These provisions
are unclear or nonexistent in most of the new codes but the participating attorneys were
confident that the main effect of the transition would be to place investigation squarely
under the jurisdiction of the prosecution in criminal cases.57
The notion of becoming familiar with the opponent’s case if for no other reason
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See Sarles, footnote 11, supra. In the Italian conversion, one of the first transition to the
accusatorial model amongst European countries, it evolved that the judge was gradually removed
from any role in the gathering of evidence, other than to issue arrest, search or wiretapping
warrants and overseeing the course of discovery. The prosecutor was thus left with almost
unlimited powers in the crucial steps of preliminary investigation, thus breaking the traditional
balance of power between the judge and prosecutor and leading many judges to feel like little
more than a “notary.” See Ennio Amodio, supra, note 21, p. 491-493.
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than to be able to conduct a reasonable cross-examination was equally unfamiliar. If
the prosecutor had already interviewed the witnesses and the police, there was no
reason, argued the students, to conduct any separate defense interviews until the time
of trial.
Even the criminal defense lawyers were reticent to doubt the credibility of the
state’s investigation or to agree that an in-depth challenge to all state evidence where
possible is part of the professional duty. Because all agreed that the police would do
little or nothing to flesh out the defense, the lawyers were more comfortable with the
idea of simply developing a defense case, independent of the prosecution, and letting
the prosecution put its case together without interference or even participation by the
defense. Neither the criminal nor the civil lawyers had ever heard of the analogy
between trial lawyers and architects: that both sides have the same raw materials but
each side will build a different building. The tendency, rather, was to accept the
building as presented by the plaintiff/prosecutor, to avoid attacking the edifice and
merely to construct a defense which relied mainly on saying that the opposing case
lacked credibility.
The prevailing legal culture in most Latin countries that the police or other paid
investigators of the government do the investigating and that the lawyers have no role
independent of those investigations poses serious issues for the future success of the
party model in Latin America. In fact, criminal investigation is one of the most serious
and neglected problems in most underdeveloped systems, with police having no access
to forensic methods, relying primarily on witness statements58 and the confession.59
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O’Shaughnessy and Dodson, supra, note 25, p. 11
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The use of sophisticated and expensive investigatory techniques is just beginning and
only in those countries willing to spend resources on the justice system and law
enforcement. In some places, scientific and technical experts are beginning to be used
in the justice system. To the participants, however, the idea that a lawyer could
investigate complicated scientific matters and then effectively compete on crossexamination with a doctor, forensic specialist or other kind of expert was completely
unknown to them.
D) The role of the judge. The role of the judge changes most dramatically in
the changeover to the party system. The groups of judges in these programs found
their new roles most unacceptable even though, under the new system, they retain the
ultimate power of final decision at the trial level. They were very accustomed to being
in charge of most aspects of the proceedings: calling whichever witnesses they wanted,
in the order they chose, and then asking all or most of the questions. For a judge to be
“reduced” to the role of referee, merely ruling on objections or legal points, seen but not
heard until there is a problem, was perhaps too shocking for them to absorb in the few
short weeks of the programs. Time and again, the simulations were derailed by a
“judge” (whether in role or really a judge) who wanted to find out immediately whatever
it was he or she wanted to know and was not willing to let the examinations take their
course. In that situation, the judge would either insist on questioning, arguing with the
lawyers, introducing into evidence items that neither counsel had submitted, or simply
commenting very prematurely on credibility.
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It was common, for example, for a role-

Yamin and Noriega Garcia, supra, note 26, p. 31 (The Role of the Judiciary in the
Perpetuation of Torture)
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playing participant to rule on an objection or motion with commentary to the effect that
he/she simply didn’t believe the testimony. Whenever there was an objection,
particularly a relevancy objection, the judges were likely to assess both the legal
aspects and the credibility of the witness, or just simply offer their own opinion of what
the witness was or was not saying. Since the jury system appears to one of the less
feasible transplants to Latin systems, the judge (and any associate “assessors” or
panels of judges as exist in some systems)60 will remain the final determiners of
credibility and, as such, will retain the ultimate decision-making power. Because judges
are on a separate professional career track and because they are often the products of
judicial-training institutions,61 it should be feasible to convince at least the next
generation of the judiciary that the need in the transition is to adapt to a different but not
inferior role.
One side effect of this problem of hyper-active judges was a high occurrence of
argument among counsel and the bench. Rather than focus on the jury or on the flow
of the case and the importance of telling a story, counsel very quickly would get
engaged in heated debate or “legal” argument that could easily have been avoided or
simply wasn’t worth the disruption. In the author’s experience, this is also typical of
U.S. students.
E) Plea-bargaining. The debate over plea-bargaining was never-ending. In
most Latin systems, a trial is eventually held in every case that isn’t dismissed during
60

See e.g., the Criminal Procedures Code of Honduras, effective February, 2002, under
which the oral, accusatorial system is to replace the written, inquisitorial system. Trials will be
presided over by three judges, one at each state of the trial.
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the investigation phase . That trial, however, may seem more like a guilty plea in that
the judge will often review the written summarized evidence, not call any witnesses (the
defendant in the criminal case is the most common witness), and restrict the lawyers to
arguing matters pertaining to sentencing. A resolution of the matter pre-trial by
conference between the attorneys, with or without the judge, was previously unknown,
although there are now signs of change in a number of national systems that have
converted to the party model.62 Under the old model, there are not two parties between
whom there can be a negotiation and agreement. There is no tradition of compromising
on the charge or on the facts of the case since the official duty is the discovery of the
“truth,” meaning in this context that, even if the defendant admits guilt, the process goes
on through a formal “trial” so as to properly apply the law to the facts and then to decide
the sentence.63 There is no recognition that the defense lawyer is an equal partner to
the proceedings along with the judge and the “official” prosecutor. Even should there
be some sort of agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant, there is, in the
inquisitorial model, no provision that the judge should even hear of such a compromise
much less be bound by it.
The students came quickly to the understanding that, without plea-bargaining,
the American system would collapse under its own weight. When they heard that in
excess of 90% of all our cases are decided by guilty plea or by settlement, our avowed
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Field and FisherIII, supra, note 5, p. 53.
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Ennio Amodio, supra, note 21, p. 491. See also, Jonathan L. Hafetz, supra, note 2.
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Steven E. Hendrix, supra, note 29, p. 390.
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dedication to the jury system resonated less.64 Several practical aspects of the guilty
plea process struck many participants as clear violations of human rights. For example,
it is common practice in the United States that, in exchange for a guilty plea, an indicted
charge will be reduced. In some jurisdictions, depending on the local legal culture, the
prosecutor may even threaten that, if the defendant chooses not to plead guilty, a new
indictment can be sought which would, in fact, increase the severity of the charges to
be faced.65 That sort of a threat was seen as coercive to many participants and a threat
to due process. Another practice that seemed anathema to them is the procedure
sanctioned by the so-called Alford66 plea, whereby a not-guilty person could
nonetheless plead guilty to simply get out of pretrial incarceration and dispose of the
charges. Many participants argued that the Alford plea is completely violative of every
due process sense they had and renders the right to trial and the right to jury trial
illusory. Finally, the idea that a prosecutor would over-charge a defendant to have
more leeway in plea bargaining was also generally seen as unethical and anti64

Greg Berman, Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of
Justice, 41 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 1313, 1317 (2004).
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Bodenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). For a complete discussion of the
implications of Bodenkircher, see William J. Stuntz, Bodenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea
Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, Harvard Public Law Working Paper 120,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=854284.
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 168. Because the likelihood of
conviction is high and the sanctions potentially severe, a defense lawyer may recommend a
negotiated guilty plea even where the defendant maintains his/her innocence, as long as there is a
“strong factual basis for the plea.” This procedure is used by defendants against whom the weight
of the evidence is heavy, in spite of their innocence. They choose to minimize their exposure to
the longer prison sentence should the trier of fact choose to believe the state’s case. The Alford
plea is also used by defendant incarcerated pretrial who plead innocence but who eventually
plead guilty if the sentence offered is probation and they can be released.
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defendant.67
F) Theory and theme of the case. For a number of reasons, the lawyers
exhibited very limited capacity to develop a theory of the case68 and even less
willingness to see that task as key in a system focused on a credible narrative of
events. In both argument and witness examination, they would project inconsistent or
highly speculative defenses or spend large amounts of time and effort solidifying a key
point of the opponent as a side effect of having pounced on a clearly collateral
inconsistency. The notion that a party must be able to explain their case in a short twosentence summation was widely resisted. Though the development of a theme69 to use
in opening statements and closing arguments was more popular and seen by the
67

Note that, in various European countries, the notion of plea-bargaining has taken hold,
albeit with important differences from the U.S. system. Nonetheless, one commentator see pleabargaining as the “Trojan horse” of the adversarial system. See Maximo Langer, From Legal
Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 1,35 (2004). In Latin
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the case must combine your undisputed evidence and your version of the disputed evidence that
you will present in storytelling form at trial.” Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques (6th Ed. 2002),
p. 507.
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By theme, trial lawyers usually mean a short leit motif or refrain that summarizes the
theory and can be repeated often enough so as to impose itself on the consciousness of the factfinder. Mauet, Id. at 509
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participants as perhaps an amusing rhetorical device, there was a general conclusion
that a theme would not be usable before a judicial panel trier of fact in Latin America.
As to the theory and theme of the case, it is clear that the nature of legal
argument in Latin countries is to paint with a broad brushstroke. The students, whether
judges or simply lawyers, had very little eye for the kind of minute detail which, when
exploited, can distinguish a guilty from a non-guilty, liability from non-liability.
G) The Presentation of “Novel” Types of Evidence. Least surprising of all was
the students’ reluctance to see video and computer evidence or other types of
demonstrative tools as useful or likely to be used in the presentation of the case. The
threshold issue is, of course, the resources to assemble these testimonial aids. It was
not difficult for the participants, whether they worked in under-funded prosecution or
defense office or on their own in a small office, to predict that many years will pass
before the technology of the American courtroom appears in Latin America.70 Beyond
the resources issue, it was feared that some of the newer types of evidence would
deceive the trier of fact and therefore be prejudicial. There was widespread distrust of
computerized evidence, such as accident reconstructions,71 With some degree of
indignation, one student said that computers should never be allowed to replace people
which, ultimately, is perhaps the direction of U.S. litigation. The reluctance did not
apply to forensic evidence, maps or charts, photographs or video interviews. Since it
70

That may certainly be true in the criminal system where most defendants are indigent
and public budgets are minimal. Power-point presentations, for example, have already begun to
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For a broad description of the technology and the costs, see generally, Report of the
Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, Legal Development: Report
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appears that there is very little precedent for using even the most common types of
demonstratives in Latin cases, the discussion often centered on issues of admissibility
and, in general, convincing the judge to allow the evidence to be used.
One likely explanation for the hesitation to see technology in the courtroom as an
important advance is perhaps the fact that trial lawyers in Latin America (and
elsewhere) have not traditionally had the latitude in the presentation of evidence that
has been enjoyed by American lawyers. Given the procedural strait-jacket of the
inquisitorial model and its restrictions on the role of the lawyers, Latin American
attorneys may feel that they will not be allowed to present newer forms of evidence,
demonstrative or otherwise, in courtrooms where judges are accustomed to trial by
affidavit. All agreed that the party attorney would need to request permission of the
judge to introduce a new form of evidence, whereas the U.S. trial lawyer can more
confident that a foundation of reliability can be laid.
Future
Fairness to the litigants is what should be at the heart of the changes now
sweeping through Latin American trial systems. In a hitherto closed and inaccessible
process, the real parties in interest are often left with a sense of lack of due process, a
sense that they have not received their “day in court.” Indeed, they have not in that
they had very little control over the investigation, presentation, or analysis of the case.
The change to the party system lets the litigants (with the assistance of counsel)
become a more integral part of the proceedings. The trial phase should show the most
dramatic transformation, with the counsel for the litigants now in charge of the
on Cost-Effrective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 Alb.L.Rev. 263 (1995)
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presentation of the case, with the broadening of live witness testimony, the
confrontation inherent to cross-examination, and the right to present the evidence,
including evidence in its newer forms, according to the trial plan of the party.
The oral hearing model should also encourage judges to not only be more
efficient but also more open and transparent in how they decide and in how they
manage the proceedings. The dynamic of the trial process should also change
dramatically. When there are open hearings where the parties are actually present and
offering testimony, where lawyers and judges are interacting not only over procedure
but also over the evidence, the primera instancia, will seem much more about real
problems involving real people, rather than a stack of written materials to be waded
through, summarized, and digested.72
American lawyers are comfortable with having the lawyers develop and present
the evidence favorable to the client and letting the opponent do the same. We recoil at
the notion that the judge would be the primary actor, calling the witnesses, controlling
the presentation of evidence, and commenting on the strength of the case as the trial
unfolds. Particularly in countries where the neutrality or integrity of the judiciary is
suspect, oralidad and the requirement that the case be decided on the evidence
presented by the parties rather than the evidence reviewed by the judge in some closed
proceeding seems a step forward in inducing judicial accountability for decisions.
Forced to make decisions based upon a record that was available for all to see in a
public trial will render the legal system more accessible and democratic.
The transition will also improve the quality of the trial bar and strengthen the
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ability of lawyers to be truly effective advocates. The ability to investigate and have
access to the evidence will encourage a much more proactive version of lawyering,
empowering attorneys to get fully involved in the case at a much earlier stage and to
therefore reliably predict to their clients what the evidence will be at trial and the
prospects for success. It will also help lawyers to develop the eye for detail and
contradiction that is not taught in Latin American law schools and cannot be developed
without an opportunity to truly challenge the evidence.
Oralidad will create a whole new subclass of attorneys known for their courtroom
brilliance, their ability to creatively present a case and to attack the case against them.
More importantly, any lawyer trained in the party system should eventually feel the
interest of the client, rich or poor, powerful or powerless, can be leveraged onto an even
playing field where the primary focus of the case, by virtue of the attorney’s ability to
examine, cross-examine, and argue, will be on the rights of all the parties, not just those
favored by the judge.
One can only hope that once the reins of management of the case are loosened
from the grip of the trial judge, that the opposing parties, in the spirit of civil but hardfought combat, will take the proceedings much more into the realm of the everyday and
trials and court hearings will become more accessible to the understanding of the nonlawyer. Judges, as the ultimate decision-makers, should not see their management
roles as diminished but rather redirected. The demystification of the trial process
should be an integral component in maximizing the impetus to use the courts.
The purpose of this article has been to anticipate some of the problems that will
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be brought on by the change in trial systems. Those changes will engender a new set
of problems about which trial lawyers will soon be making demands for change. One
of those problem areas concerns rules of evidence. The author has participated in two
projects to develop rules of evidence and discovery, it having become obvious that trial
procedures alone were not sufficient to complete the transition. The need for rules of
evidence should be clear. There are quite simply no well-accepted rules that govern
the admissibility of evidence, including even generally agreed-upon concepts of
relevance. For example, the trial lawyers and the judges in the programs, whether real
or in-role, would quickly seek to introduce the criminal defendant’s character or past
encounters with the law, regardless of when they occurred, their seriousness, whether
they resulted in a conviction, or whether the defendant had testified.73 For another,
hearsay was occasionally objected to but on a relevance basis. It was surprising to
learn that the Spanish word for hearsay74 is not commonly used in Latin courts and that
there is no general rule for admissibility of hearsay, much less for exceptions. As a
third example, judges will commonly dismiss witnesses as incompetent on any number
and variety of grounds such as children under sixteen, persons with disabilities such as
blindness, all extended family relatives, and the like.75
Some of this lack of uniformity of practice is understandable, given that many of
the federal and state rules of evidence in the U.S. are predicated on a need to protect
juries from prejudicial or irrelevant information. In a system where juries are unknown
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but where judges are assumed, as in the rest of the world, to be fair and impartial, there
is theoretically less need to filter the evidence since a judge is less likely to be
prejudiced and more likely to give the evidence the weight it deserves. It is also
probably true that, as more than one participant observed, we have overly complicated
questions of admissibility to the point where there is little internal coherence to our
theory that juries are competent on some matters and not so competent on others.
Nonetheless, even in a system where the judge and assessors or rapporteurs are the
final decision-makers, there is a need for uniformity of practice on the admissibility of
evidence. There have been a few initiatives toward codifications of evidence rules in
Latin America that are, as yet, incipient.76
Equally clear is the need for more comprehensive rules of discovery. There are
precious few discovery devices available to attorneys in either the pretrial or trial
phases. Copies of the complaint and statement of the defendant are commonly
available but there is normally no provision for access to scientific evidence, statements
of witnesses, interrogatories, depositions, and the like.77 One concern, of course, would
be that new rules of discovery could be used to impede and delay the trial process,
much as occurs in the United States when the discovery process is abused. Another
concern is that any inequality between the parties could be exploited during discovery,
disadvantaging the party with fewer resources.
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If one can generalize in this evolving situation, it seems clear that, with the party
system, there are effects beyond the orality, the reduced role of the judge, and the
increased role of the lawyers as architects of the cases presented. When lawyers can
take a much more aggressive role on behalf of their clients, even if cases do not come
to trial more quickly,78 the trials themselves take place much more quickly and therefore
are more focused on the key points.79 When witnesses are actually called and
examinations conducted, the trial becomes more transparent than it was when the
review of affidavits was the key judicial function.
Obviously, the greatest variable in assessing the potential for success of the
changeover to the party system is the political climate in each country. As elsewhere,
the passing of a new procedure code or even new rules of evidence and discovery does
little to achieve real reform in dysfunctional or corrupt legal systems. From the apex of
government structure to the lowest level of political and legal organization, the political
will to change as part of the democratization process must be manifested in more than
just words. The feedback received from the former students informs that many judges
have refused to changeover or that they merely give lip service to the new models.
Corruption is, of course, another problem that cuts across all procedural models
throughout the world, threatening to undermine any reform project. Given the
widespread perception of the legal system as corrupt and the few resources expended
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in most Latin countries on public education, it will be difficult to combat the public
perception of judicial corruption, unfairness, and lack of independence.

With

continued ethics training at judicial and prosecutorial schools, with appointment of
judges regardless of political connections, with heightened visibility through media and
technology of the conduct of trials, with strong disciplinary actions against the corrupt,
and with the ability of lawyers to protest in open court any perceived bias of the bench,
there is at least the potential for reform.
The prospects for a short-term changeover period with rapid implementation of
the new procedures are not good. At issue is not only the procedural and statutory
reform but also a complete overhaul of the culture of the courtroom and the role of
lawyers. Attempting to train present judges and lawyers will have some usefulness in
the transformation but, on the whole, the best prospects for the legal reform movement
lie within the law schools. The training of the professors and the revision of the
curriculum are key components in assessing the long-term prospects for the transition.
If law professors can be persuaded to teach practice as well as theory and if the course
offerings, both substantively and methodologically, can be modified to reflect the needs
of the practitioner, then the next generation will learn not only the doctrinal law of the
party system, both substantively and procedurally, but also the practice skills that are
needed to implement that system.
As deficient as the U.S. system may be in so many practical ways, the North
American model represents probably the best structural framework of the party system.
Even if it weren’t, Latin American countries would be tempted to emulate the U.S. legal
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infrastructure and procedures simply because globalization has made the U.S. a
reference point for most legal and economic initiatives. U.S. government resources
spent on legal reform in Latin America are well-spent, not only because the result is
more American-friendly but also because the people of the region are well-served.
USAID and other international organizations in which the U.S. plays a major role such
as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
World Bank should consider expanding their efforts help these reforms sift to the base
of each individual Latin country involved in the transition.
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